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CASES NOTED
vertible statement of public policy.-5 Although a particular act may be
the result of "pressurized" legislation, designed to change established
theories of liability, it should not be so strictly construed as to result in a
partial defeat of over-all legislative intent. This anomalous situation created
by legislative omission can readily be corrected, not only by legislating, but
also by a judicial finding that the clause in question is a contractual
limitation that has been provided for in the act.
ADMIRALTY-RIGHT OF CREW UNDER "LAY PLAN" TO
RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH
ADVANTAGEOUS ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Libelants were engaged in fishing under a lay plan' as the crew of the
Bear. Respondents' boat, the Marsha Ann, collided with and damaged the
Bear, necessitating the Bear's return to port and compelling her crew to
abandon their fishing venture. The crew libeled the respondents for dam-
ages based upon their expectant share of profits under the lay plan. Held,
the Marsha Ann negligently damaged the Bear, for which her owners were
awarded damages;2 but the crew sustained only damnun absque injuria.
Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct.
293 (1952).3
Collision cases involving the rights of seamen under a lay plan have
been rare. It has been held that such seamen may join with their boat
owners against an intentional- tort-feasor.4 Also, where the fish were al-
ready caught when the collision occurred recovery was allowed the crew
against the negligent boat's owner." In addition, where the owner of a neg-
ligent vessel was also the employer of the crew of the damaged boat, the
members of the crew, though under the lay plan, were allowed to sue in
their own names for the loss of prospective profits." However, the courts
are divided as to whether a crew on the lay plan may join with the owner
25. The Irrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187 (1897); The Jason, sutira note 22.
1. The lay plan is an agreement whereby seamen receive as their compensation a
certain share or profit of the proceeds of the voyage (usually fish). In the instant case
the crew's collective lay was 68%; whereas the owners' share was 32%. However, the
courts are divided as to what kind of interest a crew's lay share represents. Some cases
have followed the rule adopted by Lord Avanley in Wilkinson v. Frasier, 4 Esp. 182, 170
Eng. Rep. 684 (1802) and regard the shares under the lay plan as wages. See United
States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1928); Reed v. Hussey, 20 Fed. Cas. No.
11,646, at 444 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1836); Lewis v. Chadbourne, 54 Me. 484, 485 (1865).
Some decisions apparently regard the crew's interest under the lay plan as a tenancy in
common The Columbia 6 Fed. Gas. 173, No. 3,035 (E.D.N.Y. 1877); The Mary
Steele, 16 Fed. Cas. 1003, No. 9,226 (D. Mass. 1873).
2. The court awarded damages of $4,320 as the owners' 32% interest in the prospec-
tive catch and $17,770.67 as a reasonable amount for the cost of repairs.
3. Mr. Justice Black took the unusual position that not only should certiorari be
granted, but that the judgment should be reversed.
4. United States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1928).
5. The Mary, 61 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
6. Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. DiLeva, 171 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1948).
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against a negligent tort-feasor, after a collision at sea before any fish are
caught.7
In the instant case the court was aware that recovery for expectant
profits has been allowed crews under the lay plan;8 but, nevertheless, it chose
to follow the decisions holding otherwise., In addition, the court empha-
sized the distinctions bctween the principal case and those cases allowing
recovery to crew members on the lay plan. Thus, it pointed out that United
States v. Laflin'0 involved an intentional tort and that Van Camp Sea
Food Co. Inc. v. DiLevall was "bottomed on its own peculiar facts . . . [in]
that the owner of the boat could not be expected, as trustee, to bring an ac-
tion on behalf of the crew against himself for his own negligence."' 2  The
decision in the instant case essentially relied upon the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.1 That case held that a
time charterer 14 who, unknown to the defendant dry dock company, was under
contract to the boat owner, had no cause of action for the loss of his advan-
tageous bargaining position, as a result of the defendant's negligence in repair-
ing the propeller of the ship according to a contract between defendant and
the ship owner. The Supreme Court' applied the rule that " . . . a tort to the
person or property of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other
unknown to the doer of the wrong."
The instant case easily can be distinguished from the Robins case. In
that case, the defendant dry dock company did not know of the time char-
terer's agreement with the ship owner, with whom defendant contracted and
had paid damages for its negligence before the time charterer had brought
suit. Query, can it be said that the captain of a ship that negligently dam-
ages another fishing vessel does not know that in all probability the dam-
aged ship's crew is either compensated by wages or the lay plan?' 6 In view
7. The Columbia, The Mary Steele, supra note 1 (joinder permitted). Contra:
Taber v. Jenny, 23 Fed. Cas. 605, No. 13,720 (D. Mass. 1856); Crozier v. Atwood, 21
Mass. 234, 4 Pick. 243 (1826) (joinder disallowed).
8. ". . . cases . . . have allowed fishermen to recover forloss of prospective profits."
Borcich v. Aneich, 191 F.2d 392, 396. See note 7 supra.
9. Taber v. Jenny, Crozier v. Atwood, supra note 7.
10. 24 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1928).
11. 171 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1948).
12. Borcich v. Ancich, supra note 8, at 398.
13. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
14. A time charterer is one to whom a ship is let out for hire, the owner retaining
possession and control over her navigation. The Beaver, 219 Fed. 139, 141 (9th Cir.
1915).
15. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308 (1927); Borcich v.
Ancich, supra note 8, at 397.
16. Whether employment under the lay plan gives seamen a property interest such
as a tenancy in common with the ship owner or is merely the equivalent of wages, see
note 1 supra. Professor Prosser suggests that recovery should be allowed against a negligent
tort-feasor who reasonably should have foreseen that his negligence would interfere with
another's advantageous economic relationship. PRossER, TORTS 993 (1941).
CASES NOTED
of the well-established doctrine that seamen are the wards of admiralty,17
this court's holding that a negligent tort-feasor owes no duty to seamen
employed under the lay plan upon the seas appears to be a harsh and unjus-
tifiably severe rule.
BAIL-GRANT TO SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
Petitioner's appeal from municipal court conviction of a misdemeanor
involving sexual offenses was suspended' and petitioner held pending
hearing in the superior court to determine whether he was a sexual psycho-
path. The court denied his application for bail. Held, reversed. An alleged
sexual psychopath is entitled to bail as a matter of right pending such
hearings. Application of Keddy, 233 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1951). 2
Historically, the granting of bail in both civil and criminal actions was
within the discretion of the judge.3 The present "right" to bail is dependent
upon statute.4 Constitutional provisions generally apply only to criminal
cases,5 but the right to bail in all civil actions became fixed by early statu-
tory enactment and is now generally assumed.0 The Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution has also been deemed specifically applicable
only to criminal cases, but there have been instances when courts have
referred to the spirit of the amendment to include civil actions; 7 this right
being unimpaired by the absence of specific legislative authority.8
By great weight of authority, psychopathic hearings are independent 9
17. 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 282 (6th ed., Knauth, 1940); see discussion by Frank,
of the doctrine that seamen are the wards of admiralty, in Hume v. More-McCormack
nes, Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1941).
1. Upon proper affidavit, criminal proceedings may be suspended and the alleged
sexual psychopath brought before the superior court for examination and hearing. CAL.
WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE §- 5501 (1949) (as amended).
2. This principle has been twice affirmed: Ex parte Morehead, 237 P.2d 335 (Cal.
1951); Ex parte Rice, 234 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1951).
3. Manning v. Williams, 190 Okla. 65, 120 P.2d 980 (1942).
4. For instance, the CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. § 486 provides for bail in
civil actions as a matter of right. The court in the instant case might have relied
upon this Civil Code instead of the California constitutional guarantees.
5. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945); State v. Hutchinson,
246 Ala. 48, 18 So.2d 723 (1944); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267 (1943).
6. But see Varholy v. Sweat, supra note 5 (quarantine order is not a criminal
proceeding and is not bailable); Espinosa v. Price, supra note 5 (proceedings under
Juvenile Delinquency Act are governed by rules of civil procedure; not constitutional
and statutory provisions for bail in criminal cases); State v. Hutchinson, supra note 5
(constituitional provisions for bail apply only to criminal cases and have no application
to one detained on suspicion of being affected with disease).
7. Mozorosky v. Hulbert, 106 Ore. 274, 211 Pac. 893 (1923); State v. Foster, 84
Wash. 58, 146 Pac. 170 (1915).
8. See Wright v. Henkle, 190 U.S. 63 (1902).
9. Trial court loses jurisdiction when proceedings are suspended, to be regained
only upon negative determination of psychosis by superior court. Ex parte Morehead,
supra note 2.
